INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY

Equivalences among five game specifications, including a new specification whose nodes are sets of past choices

Lies and consequences

Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives

Compromises and Rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching

Cooperation and endogenous repetition in an infinitely repeated social dilemma

Weakly differentially monotonic solutions for cooperative games

Dynamic matching pennies on networks

Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games

An epistemic approach to stochastic games

Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions

Equilibrium payoffs in repeated two-player zero-sum games of finite automata

An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems

Multiplayer games as extension of misère games

Rationalizability in multicriteria games

Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference

An analysis of dual-issue final-offer arbitration

Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring

Paths to stable allocations

Bankruptcy problems with reference-dependent preferences

Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions

Matching with restricted trade

On the equal treatment imputations subset in the bargaining set for smooth vector-measure games with a mixed measure space of players

Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information

PSPACE-complete two-color planar placement games

Catch games: the impact of modeling decisions

Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects

Strategic information transmission despite conflict

Limited focus in dynamic games

My scientific first-born: a clarification

Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable

Composition independence in compound games: a characterization of the Banzhaf power index and the Banzhaf value

The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining

Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization

Simultaneous but independent ultimatum game: strategic elasticity or social motive dependency?

Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information

Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games

Self-recognition in teams

On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention

The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs

Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies

Robust multiplicity with (transfinitely) vanishing naiveté

Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers