PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY

A competence framework for artificial intelligence research

Ecological and ethical issues in virtual reality research: A call for increased scrutiny

The meta-ethical significance of experiments about folk moral objectivism

Longer, smaller, faster, stronger: On skills and intelligence

The intelligent reflex

Extraversion and compatibilist intuitions: a ten-year retrospective and meta-analyses

Embodied cognition and abstract concepts: Do concept empiricists leave anything out?

Intellectualism and the argument from cognitive science

Models and mechanisms in network neuroscience

The experience machine and the expertise defense

Beyond free will: The embodied emergence of conscious agency

Symbiotic cognition as an alternative for socially extended cognition

Manic temporality

Memory systems and the control of skilled action

An empirical investigation of guilty pleasures

Causal deviance and the ascription of intent and blame

Lessons for experimental philosophy from the rise and “fall” of neurophilosophy

The dynamic and recursive interplay of embodiment and narrative identity

The content of Marr’s information-processing framework

How does evidence-based practice in psychology work? – As an ethical demarcation

Manipulating body representations with virtual reality: Clinical implications for anorexia nervosa

The flow of narrative in the mind unmoored: An account of narrative processing

Perceptual precision

Out on a limb? On multiple cognitive systems within the octopus nervous system

What is ‘mental action’?

Payback without bookkeeping: The origins of revenge and retaliation

An epistemic argument for liberalism about perceptual content

Methods, minds, memory, and kinds

Using neural response properties to draw the distinction between modal and amodal representations

Intersubjectivity in infancy: A second-person approach to ontogenetic development

Objective and epistemic gradability: Is the new angle on the Knobe effect empirically grounded?

Reply to Philip Woodward’s review of The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Lucky joint action

The role of nature and brain in demystifying the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics”

Meditation and the scope of mental action

Active desire

Putting psychology before metaphysics in moral responsibility: Reactive attitudes and a “gut feeling” that can trigger and justify them

Editor’s introduction

Primer, proposal, and paradigm: A review essay of Mendelovici’s The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Self-deception and shifting degrees of belief

Autism, aspect-perception, and neurodiversity

From personality disorders to the fact-value distinction

The enigma of reason

Know-how, intellectualism, and memory systems

The problem of mind and mental acts in the perspective of psychology in the Lvov-Warsaw School